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Case No. 20150357-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

i.iJ

STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff!Appellee,

v.

BILLY ROHWEDDER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Billy Rohwedder appeals from convictions for theft by
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony; failing to stop at the
command of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony; and failure to
signal, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
Billy Rohwedder was apprehended for driving a stolen vehicle and
convicted following a jury trial. On appeal, this Court summarily reversed
vi

the convictions, finding that the trial court failed to address Rohwedder' s
claims of self-representation. On retrial, Rohwedder self-represented with
the assistance of standby counsel and was again convicted.
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On appeal, Rohwedder filed a Rule 23B motion for remand, which
this Court has already denied. Now, in his brief, Rohwedder challenges the
trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation,
arguing that the case should be remanded for the trial court to "make
proper findings to enable appellate review." Aplt. Br. 5. He then argues
that his right to self-representation on retrial was violated by his standby
counsel's alleged failures to procure witnesses essential to his defense and
to provide him access to relevant legal materials. Finally, he argues that the
trial court erred by requiring him to be restrained with leg restraints in view
of the jury during trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
la. Rohwedder requested most of the delay and stipulated to the rest,
has not established that any delay prejudiced him, and even concedes that
on this record he cannot prove a speedy trial violation. Has he established
that his right to a speedy trial was violated?
1b. Rohwedder concedes that the existing record does not establish
that his counsel was ineffective for asking for most of the continuances and
agreeing to the rest. Has he proven ineffective assistance of counsel?

-2-
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Standard of Review. "We review the issue of whether a defendant was
deprived of his right to a speedy trial for correctness." State v. Hawkins,
2016 UT App 9, if 68, 366 P.3d 884, 899. Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State

v. Fowers, 2011 UT App 383, if15,265 P.3d 832.
2a. Did Rohwedder waive his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel when he chose to defend himself?
2b. If not, does the existing record support Rohwedder' s claim that
his standby counsel performed ineffectively, thereby violating his right to
self-representation?

Standard of Review.

11

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised

for the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004
Wt)

UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162.
3. Has Rohwedder proven that the trial court erroneously allowed
the jury to see him in leg restraints where the sergeant specifically explained
that use of a taser vest was in addition to, and not instead of, leg restraints,
and the jury saw the restraints because Rohwedder insisted on walking
around the courtroom despite the trial court's instruction that both parties
remain seated?

la
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Standard of Review.

A claim that a defendant was denied his

constitutional rights to a fair trial is reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, if4, 57 P.3d 1134, 1135.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah R. App. P. 23B

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When a West Jordan police officer saw Rohwedder driving a car
reported as stolen, he began to follow it. R705:113, 118, 120. The officer
activated his emergency lights and siren, but Rohwedder accelerated.
R705:123.

The officer terminated his pursuit and started to set up a

containment plan. R705:123-24. When he moved his car to get into a good
position to map the area, he observed the stolen car stopped and
abandoned, with the door open and the engine still running. R705:126-28.
Another officer located Rohwedder half a block from the abandoned car.
R705:186-88; 706:110.

Rohwedder was breathing heavily and sweating

despite the cold temperature. R705:137, 188. A third officer arrived with a
K9 dog, who had tracked the scent from the abandoned car directly to
Rohwedder. R704:18-22.

-4-
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On December 16, 2011, the State charged Rohwedder with, inter alia,
one count of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, one count of Failure to
Stop or Respond at Command of a Police Officer, and one count of Failure
to Signal. R2-3.
The case was tried to the jury on January 14 and 15, 2014. R279-80.
Rohwedder timely appealed, and this court summarily reversed the
convictions because the trial court failed to address Rohwedder' s request to
represent himself. R314-16.
~

On April 7 and 8, 2015, the case was again tried to a jury, with
Rohwedder representing himself, assisted by standby counsel. R704-05.
4:>

Rohwedder timely appealed his convictions to this court. R617-18.
On March 28, 2016, Rohwedder filed a Rule 23B Motion for Remand,
arguing that the case should be remanded for the record to be developed as
to: (1) the reasons appointed counsel requested multiple continuances over

\J

Rohwedder' s objections, and (2) standby counsel's failure to provide
Rohwedder access to legal materials prior to trial and to help him secure the
presence of witnesses essential to his defense. See Motion for Rule 23B
Remand at 2, 15. On April 11, 2106, this Court denied Rohwedder' s Rule
23B remand motion in its entirety. See Order Denying Remand, addendum

B.

-5-
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The State includes additional facts and background in the relevant
argument sections.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rohwedder has failed to establish that on this record his right to a
speedy trial was violated.

Rohwedder's counsel requested most of the

delay and stipulated to the rest, Rohwedder has failed to establish that any
delay prejudiced him, and he concedes that on this record he cannot prove a
speedy trial violation. Recognizing this, Rohwedder claims that his counsel
was ineffective in making the requested continuances over his alleged
objections. But as Rohwedder also concedes, the existing record does not
establish that his counsel was ineffective for asking for most of the
continuances and agreeing to the rest.
The record also does not support Rohwedder' s claim that his standby
counsel performed ineffectively, thereby violating his right to selfrepresentation. First, Rohwedder waived his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel when he chose to defend himself, and he has
no right to the effective assistance of standby counsel. And even if he did,
Rohwedder has not shown that his standby counsel were ineffective. As
Rohwedder acknowledged in initially moving for a Rule 23B remand, the
record is silent as to what efforts standby counsel made to locate

-6-
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Rohwedder' s witnesses. The record also is silent as to Rohwedder' s claim
that counsel did not provide requested materials. When the record is silent,
the presumption of reasonable action by counsel stands.
Finally, Rohwedder' s claim that the trial court required him to
participate in his trial shackled and in full view of the jury is wholly without
merit. Rohwedder does not contest the trial court's determination that some
form of restraint was necessary to maintain courtroom security, and the
sergeant specifically explained that a taser vest could be used only with leg
restraints, not as a substitute. And Rohwedder himself was responsible for
making his leg restraints noticeable to the jury. The trial court ensured that
Rohwedder' s leg restraints would not be noticeable to the jury by providing
that both parties would remain seated.

Despite that accommodation,

Rohwedder chose to move around the courtroom, making his leg restraints
visible. Under such circumstances there is no violation of Rohwedder' s
right to a fair trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Record Refutes Defendant's Speedy Trial Claim and Does
Not Support His Related Ineffective Assistance Claim.

Rohwedder challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss
for a speedy trial violation. Aplt.Br. 5-19. He argues that "[t]he trial court

~
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failed to adequately assess Mr. Rohwedder' s speedy trial claim and failed to
make proper findings to enable appellate review." Aplt. Br. 5.
But as Rohwedder concedes, "the vast majority of the requests to
continue were made by Mr. Rohwedder's counsel." See Aplt. Br. S, 14-15,
16, 19. Having asked for the continuances, Rohwedder cannot claim that
they violated his right to a speedy trial.
Rohwedder argues that his counsel asked for the continuances over
his objection. But the record does not support this assertion. And this
Court has already denied Rohwedder's Rule 23B motion for a remand to
further inquire into Rohwedder' s claim that counsel requested multiple
continuances over his objection.
A. Relevant proceedings.

The State filed the Information charging Rohwedder on December 16,
2011. Rl. The case was originally set for a preliminary hearing on February
9, 2012. But on that date Rohwedder requested a new preliminary hearing
date.

The court rescheduled the hearing March 1, 2012.

R20-21.

Rohwedder was bound over as charged. R22-23.
The case was continued a number of times between March 2012 and
August 2012, on either the court's motion or the motion of Rohwedder's
counsel. R24-28. On March 12, 2012, the court continued the case because

-8-
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~

Rohwedder had not been transported and failed to appear.

R24.

Rohwedder' s counsel requested the next continuance, on April 9, 2012,
because Rohwedder refused transport and failed to appear. R25. On June
4, 2012, Rohwedder' s counsel requested a continuance to determine
whether the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was conflicted out. R27.
In August 2012, Rohwedder requested the matter be set for jury trial.
GP

R29-30. The trial was set for January 8, 2013. Id. On December 28, 2012, the
State filed a stipulated motion to continue the jury trial, which the court
granted on January 3, 2013. R36, 38.
The final pretrial hearing on January 7, 2013, was continued at
Rohwedder' s counsel's request because Rohwedder refused transport and
failed to appear. R41. The matter was rescheduled for a jury trial in April
2013, but continued by stipulation to June 2013 because the State's witnesses
were unavailable in April. R45.
Rohwedder' s counsel then requested two continuances, on June 10
and 24, 2013, for Rohwedder to be evaluated for treatment. R47-48, 714:3.
Rohwedder failed to appear at the hearing set for July 1, 2013. RS0-52. On
July 15, 2013, the court granted Rohwedder' s motion to have the case
continued due to "new cases pending." R54. On July 29, 2013, the matter
was again set for a jury trial in September. R64-65.

~
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On the September 2013 trial date, during jury selection, the court
granted Rohwedder' s counsel's motion to continue the trial date to assess
Rohwedder's competency. R305:47-51. On December 9, 2013, Rohwedder
appeared with new counsel and requested that the matter be set for trial.
R179. The trial proceeded as scheduled on January 14 and 15, 2014. R27980.
After his case was reversed on appeal and sent back to the trial court
for a new trial, Rohwedder was not transported for a hearing which was
held on March 9, 2015. R708:3. Rohwedder was representing himself, but
his standby counsel represented that Rohwedder wanted a continuance in
order to locate some officers and other evidence. R708:3-4. Standby counsel
also represented that Rohwedder would be waiving any speedy trial rights.
R708:4. The court granted the continuance and reset the trial date about a
month later. R708:5. On March 16, 2015, the State moved for a continuance,
but it was denied. R455-56, 520. The jury trial was held on April 7 and 8,
2015. R704-05.
B.

Because Defendant requested or agreed to all of the
continuances, he was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

To determine whether a defendant has been denied his Sixth
Amend1nent right to a speedy trial the courts use a four-factor balancing
test-the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's

-10-
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assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The test looks to "the conduct of both the prosecution
and the defendant." Id.
"The flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason
for delay." United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986). Under this
factor, courts look at who is to blame for each period of delay. If the reason
is attributable to the government, that period counts against the
government for speedy trial purposes; but if the reason is attributable to the
defense, it does not. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009). Thus, "to
conduct a speedy trial analysis," this Court must "examine the length of
each delay that occurred during the pertinent time period and the reason for
the delay." State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, if47, 236 P.3d 161.
Because of this, a defendant raising a speedy trial claim on appeal
must do more than point to the total period between charging and trial and
broadly argue that it exceeded constitutional bounds.

Instead, the

defendant must "analyze the length and reason for each individual delay,"
thereby showing exactly how much of the delay should count against the
government before then establishing that the amount of delay attributable
to the government violated his constitutional rights. Id. at ,r 46.

-11- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Here, Rohwedder has not and cannot meet that burden. Rohwedder
concedes that he cannot prove a speedy-trial violation on this record. That
concession alone defeats his claim.
And the concession was correct.

As Rohwedder' s tally of who

requested the most delay shows, all of the delay was attributable to
Rohwedder. See Aplt. Br. 14-15. He requested most of it. And he stipulated
to the remainder. See id.
Rohwedder also cannot establish that any delay prejudiced him. He
generally says that the two-year delay meant that memories necessarily
faded and certain witnesses were unavailable. But he has not shown in the
record where either is established. He points to nothing in the record that
establishes what evidence he could have presented but for the delay. And
he has not shown in the context of the entire evidentiary picture that any
lost evidence would have made a more favorable outcome reasonably
probable. See State v. Russell, 2000 WL 33249956, *2 (Utah Ct. App.) (holding
that defendant's "lack of specific proof that he could have located
witnesses" relevant to prejudice inquiry in speedy trial violation claim).
Rohwedder argues that he made a speedy trial demand and
personally objected to some of the continuances his counsel asked for or
agreed to. But regardless of his demand, he still asked for or agreed to all of

-12-
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l.;;j)

the continuances, either personally or through counsel.

Those choices

overrode his demand.
C.
id}

Defendant has not established ineffective assistance on this
record.

Rohwedder also argues that his counsel were ineffective by asking for
and agreeing to the continuances.

He says that they did so over his

objections. Aplt. Br. 14, 16.
Because he raises this claim on appeal, he must prove ineffective
assistance on the existing record. An "appellate court will presume that any
argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant
evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
iJiJ16-17, 12 P.3d 92. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.
And to prove ineffective assistance, he must prove that no objectively
reasonable attorney would have asked for or agreed to the continuances.
This will require him to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
w,

had legitimate reasons to do so. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688,
689 (1984) (to demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently,
defendant must show that even with the "strong presumption that [trial]
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

-13-
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assistance," the challenged action was objectively umeasonable and could
II

not be considered sound trial strategy.'").
Further, he must prove prejudice-that the continuances undermine
confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694 (a defendant "must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.").
Rohwedder effectively concedes that he cannot prove deficient
performance on this record. He argues that a remand is necessary for the
district court to inquire into the nature of the representation to see if Mr.
II

Rohwedder knowingly agreed to defense-requested continuances." Aplt.
Br. 5; see also Aplt. Br. 19 (stating that

II

the record shows that Mr.

Rohwedder, from August 16, 2013, consistently and repeatedly asserted that
II

his right to speedy trial had been violated," but then arguing that this court
needs to remand the matter to the district court to fully assess whether Mr.
Rohwedder himself agreed to the continuances"). And he concedes that
11

the record does not demonstrate ... whether defense counsel did, in fact,

make the requested continuances over Mr. Rohwedder' s objection." Aplt.
Br.16.

-14-
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Id

Rohwedder thus effectively concedes that the existing record is
insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel
legitimately asked for or agreed to the continuances.
And the current record establishes that counsel had legitimate
reasons to request or agree to the continuances. Many of the continuances
requested or agreed to by his counsel were either necessitated by
Rohwedder's failure to appear, or were necessary to have Rohwedder's
mental competency evaluated. For example, on March 12, 2012, the court
had to continue the case because Rohwedder had not been transported and
failed to appear.

R24.

Rohwedder's counsel requested the next

continuance, on April 9, 2012, because Rohwedder refused transport and
failed to appear. R25. The final pretrial hearing on January 7, 2013, was
vJ

also continued at Rohwedder' s counsel's request because Rohwedder
refused transport and failed to appear.

R41.

Rohwedder's counsel

requested two continuances, on June 10, 2013 and June 24, 2013, for
Rohwedder to be evaluated for treatment. R. 47-48; 714:3. And on the
initial September 2013 trial date, during jury selection, the court granted
Rohwedder' s counsel's motion to continue the trial date to assess
Rohwedder's competency. R305:47-51.
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Recognizing that the existing record is inadequate to establish
ineffective ass_istance, Rohwedder argues that the Court must remand the
case for further factfinding on defense counsel's motivations for requesting
the continuances. But this Court previously denied Rohwedder's Rule 23B
motion to develop the record because Rohwedder did "not include any
specific information about what that rationale was or why it would support
a determination of ineffective assistance that would be relevant in this
appeal." Order Denying Remand. See also State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App
290, ,r7, 13 P.3d 175 ("The purpose of Rule 23B is for appellate counsel to
put on evidence he or she now has, not to amass evidence that might help
prove an ineffectiveness of counsel claim"); see id. ,I10 ("Given the rule's
clear emphasis on specific factual allegations, it would be improper to
remand a claim under rule 23B for a fishing expedition." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Rohwedder failed to justify a remand to develop further
evidence on deficient performance, he must prove that element on the
existing record. As shown, he has not done so and effectively concedes that
he cannot do so.
Likewise, Rohwedder cannot prove on this record how the requested
and agreed to continuances undermine confidence in the outcome.
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As

discussed, he points to nothing in the record that establishes what evidence
he could have presented but for the delay, and has not shown in the context
of the entire evidentiary picture that any lost evidence would have made a
more favorable outcome reasonably probable. See Harrington v. Richter, 131
S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011).

In sum, Rohwedder concedes that he cannot prove a speedy trial
yjj)

violation because his counsel requested or agreed to all the trial
continuances. He also has not shown how the delay actually harmed him.
And he effectively concedes that he cannot prove ineffective assistance on
this record, and the record does not support that claim.
II.

Defendant Has No Right To The Effective Assistance Of
Standby Counsel. Even If He Did, The Record Does Not
Establish That Standby Counsel Performed Deficiently.

At his retrial, Rohwedder chose to represent himself. He now claims
that his right to self-representation was violated by his standby counsel's
alleged failures to procure witnesses essential to his defense and to provide
him access to relevant legal materials.

Aplt. Br. 19-29.

Rohwedder

specifically asserts that standby counsel failed to "provi[de] [him] with the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence and all the
other necessary information" to represent himself, and failed to help him in
11

locating a person nained Colby, who he said was the person he was going
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to meet the evening the police arrested him." Aplt. Br. 21-22. This Court
has already denied Rohwedder' s Rule 23B motion for a remand to develop
the record as to standby counsel's actions in assisting in locating witnesses
and providing materials to Rohwedder. Order Denying Remand at 1-2_.
However, unlike his speedy trial violation claim, Rohwedder' s opening
brief does not reiterate his request for a remand for further factfinding with
regard to his self-representation violation claim. Rather, Rohwedder relies
on the existing record to ask the Court to find that his right to selfrepresentation was violated. Aplt. Br. 19-29.
Rohwedder's argument conflates two mutually exclusive Sixth
Amendment rights - the right to representation by counsel and the right to
represent oneself. When Rohwedder chose the second, he waived the first.
He cannot revive the first by repackaging it as a component of the second
because he has no Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
standby counsel. And even if standby counsel's ineffective assistance could
legally deprive him of his right to represent himself, he cannot prove on this
record that it did because he cannot show that his standby counsel failed to
either adequately investigate his claim or provide him access to legal
materials.
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A. Relevant proceedings.

At his retrial, Rohwedder chose to represent himself but requested
standby counsel. R711:7-9. The trial court made it clear to Rohwedder that
he, and not standby counsel, would "be primarily responsible for things"
and "responsible for being able to comply with all the expectations."
R711:9.
At the next hearing on February 23, 2015, Rohwedder stated that he
did not "feel like" he was "being properly represented" by standby counsel
and "[t]he only thing I'm using him for is a law library." R710:11. When
the court pointed out that Rohwedder was representing himself,
Rohwedder stated that he needed access to evidence to mount his defense.
Id.

At the hearing on March 5, 2015, Rohwedder stated that he had two
witnesses he wanted to produce and that he needed access to a law library
to file motions. R709: 9-10. Standby counsel explained that "we would be
happy to assist him with whatever legal research he needs, with whatever
subpoenas he would like us to serve."

R709:12.

Standby counsel also

explained that he would "advise Mr. Rohwedder about jury selection and
Rules of Evidence and things of that nature." R709:18. Finally, standby
counsel told Rohwedder that "[w]e will make every effort to get the

V9
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witnesses," but explained that it might be difficult to do so by the following
week, when the trial was set to begin. R709:21.
The trial was set to begin on March 11, 2015. R711:15. However, on
March 9, 2015, the court granted Rohwedder's counsel's request for a
continuance so that Rohwedder could locate some officers and other
evidence, and reset the trial date for April 7, 2015. R708:3-5; R704-05.
On March 10, 2015, Rohwedder mailed a motion to the court asking
for a copy of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming that his
standby

counsel

intentionally."

was

R466.

providing

him

with

"irrelevant

materials

Rohwedder also demanded "caselaw on demand

relevant to petitioners needs." R468.
On March 15, 2015, Rohwedder filed a motion asking the court to
"produce" a person named "Colby," who was in jail in section B-2 and was
released on the same day Rohwedder was transferred from section B-3.
R443. Rohwedder then wrote a letter accusing the prosecutor, judge, and
standby counsel of a conspiracy against him, claiming inter alia that standby
counsel "refused to procure witnesses/ evidence." R496.
On March 17, 2015, Rohwedder mailed another motion to the court,
asking for "electronic access to case-law /law-library," and claiming that
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standby counsel was "ineffective in procuring proper Rules and case-law to
ij

support his duties in self-representation." R492.
At a hearing on April 6, 2015, the day before trial, Rohwedder
reiterated his claim "that there's a conspiratorial scheme here that I'm
claiming that the Court has to be involved in and I'm claiming that the legal
defender's was working in cooperation, in concert with the prosecution and
that the case would have been undoubtedly dismissed if it was properly
represented by the legal defender's office[.]" R706:12. He then claimed that
"his witness," presumably Colby or his cousin, could easily be located and
stated "[b]ut they don't want to locate my witness because they want me to
be found guilty."

R706:16.

Standby counsel replied that "as stand-by

counsel we have not refused the request, but we cannot find the individual
known as Colby that ... Mr. Rohwedder shared a cell with." Id. Standby
counsel further explained that "[w]e were given a map to locate another
witness and we'll attempt to locate that witness this evening." Id. Standby
counsel clarified that "we don't know Colby's last name and the map is a
map to his potential cousin's home from a number of years ago. So we just
iJ

do not know very much about this witness[.]"

R706:17.

In response,

Rohwedder claimed that "his witnesses" could have been found before his
last trial, because "in the beginning" he provided "a phone number that
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they could have easily called and they refused to. I had my family can· and
it was still the number at the time[.]"

R706:17-18.

Rohwedder later

reiterated his claim that he had not "been provided with the necessary
information that's going to help me and assist me in representing myself
pro se[.]"

R706:19; see also R706:25, 34, 42-43, 46, 48. Standby counsel

replied that they could "be used as a resource if there's a specific request
regarding specific cases and ... specific treatises, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, code, etc."

R706:21.

Further, standby counsel did provide

Rohwedder "with two short summaries on the Utah Rules of Evidence for
foundational purposes." Id.
At trial, standby counsel provided Rohwedder with a laptop with
access to the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Criminal Procedure. R705:6.
B. When Defendant chose to defend himself, he waived his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
and he had no right to the effective assistance of standby
counsel.

It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment

"right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
Likewise, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself.

Faretta.
But the two rights are "mutually exclusive." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT
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45, ,I15, 979 P.2d 799. So where, as here, a defendant exercises his Sixth
Amendment right to represent himself, he necessarily waives his Sixth
Amendment right to representation by counsel. State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750,
753 (Utah App. 1996). And because the right to the effective assistance of
counsel finds its source in the right to representation by counsel, see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, choosing the right to right to represent oneself
necessarily waives the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Rohwedder nevertheless claims that his right to self-representation
was violated by the alleged ineffective assistance of his standby counsel. See
Aplt. Br. 24-26. Specifically, he claims that standby co1:1nsel was ineffective
vJ

in failing to procure witnesses essential to his defense and to provide him
access to relevant legal materials. See Aplt. Br. 19-29.
But again, the only Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel depends on exercising the right to representation by counsel.
Rohwedder therefore cannot get relief based on the ineffective assistance of
counsel who did not represent him.

There is no right to "hybrid

representation" where a defendant "share[s] the duties of conducting her
defense with a lawyer." Thus, "without a constitutional right to standby
counsel, a defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of
standby counsel." Id.; see also United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th
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Cir. 1992) (holding that there is "no constitutional right to effective
assistance of standby counsel."); United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 413-14
(5th Cir. 2011) ("Because Oliver had no constitutional right to standby
counsel and because Oliver acted as his own counsel while he was
proceeding prose, he cannot prevail on a claim that standby counsel was
ineffective."); State v. Gunther, 768 N.W.2d 453, 457 (Neb. 2009) (" [T]here is
no federal Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance of
standby counsel.").
C. Alternatively, Defendant has not shown that his standby
counsel were ineffective.

To establish -ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland,
Rohwedder must first show that trial counsel's performance was deficient
by identifying specific acts or omissions that fall outside reasonable
professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. To do that,

Rohwedder must, necessarily, provide record support for his factual
assertions concerning counsel's alleged acts or omissions. See supra at 13.
As he did with his ineffective-assistance claim on the speedy trial
issue, Rohwedder has effectively conceded that he cannot prove ineffective
assistance on this record. He conceded in his Rule 23B remand motion that
"[t]he record is silent as to the efforts counsel made to locate Mr.
Rohwedder' s witnesses and to what information they were given."
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Remand Motion at 20; see also Remand Motion at 15 ("The record is silent as
to the coi:versations between Mr. Rohwedder and his standby counsel as to
counsel's actions with this information which requires supplementation of
the record"); Remand Motion at 19 (" the record is silent as to what
specifically that information was, what witnesses were in Mr. Rohwedder's
requests, and what efforts counsel made to locate these witnesses for Mr.
Rohwedder"). Without any record evidence about what standby counsel
actually did with the information provided by Rohwedder, Rohwedder
cannot overcome the strong presumption that what they did was enough.
Although Rohwedder claims that standby counsel improperly failed to
procure "his witnesses" -including an individual named Colby, and
Colby's cousin-these conclusory assertions are unsupported by the record.

See Aplt. Br. 27-28. The record establishes only that Rohwedder provided
standby counsel with information he thought would be helpful in locating
his requested witnesses, including the jail cell in which he thought Colby
was located and a map to Colby's cousin's home. R443; 706:16-17.

And

the record shows that standby counsel promised to do what they could to
~

locate the witnesses and secure their attendance at trial.
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But the record is silent about what standby counsel did to follow up.
On a silent record, the presumption that their efforts were reasonable
stands. See Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17-18 (2013).
Rohwedder also asserts that standby counsel failed to provide him
with timely access to legal materials, including the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence, and unspecified "caselaw".
Aplt. Br. 22, 27-28. But again, he has effectively conceded that the record
does not support these claims. In his rule 23B motion, Rohwedder argued
that he needed the remand to establish exactly what legal materials he
requested from standby counsel, when he requested them, and what legal
materials standby counsel actually gave to him and when. See Remand
Motion at 21 (arguing that a remand was necessary "to develop what
materials counsel provided Mr. Rohwedder"). What the record does show
is that standby counsel provided Rohwedder with some legal materials,
including "two short summaries on the Utah Rules of Evidence" and, at
trial, a laptop with access to the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

R705:6; 706:21.

But it does not show that standby counsel

unreasonably delayed providing the materials or that any delay materially
impaired Rohwedder' s defense. See, e.g., State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 736
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("The choice to represent oneself does not
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automatically give defendant access to research resources enjoyed by
professional counsel. . . . Besides the wisdom, training, and experience of
professional counsel, the benefits relinquished necessarily will include full
access to legal materials, when the defendant remains in custody pending
trial."). And again, when the record is silent, the presumption of reasonable
action by counsel stands. See Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17-18.

III.
Defendant Has Not Demonstrated That The Trial Court
Denied Him A Fair Trial By Allowing The Jury To See Him
In Leg Restraints; Defendant Allowed The Jury To See His
Restraints When He Refused To Comply With The Court's
Direction To Both Parties To Remain Seated.

Rohwedder argues that the court erred by requiring him to be
restrained with leg restraints in view of the jury during trial. Rohwedder' s
claim fails because Rohwedder himself was responsible for rriaking his leg
restraints visible to the jury.
A. Relevant proceedings.

The issue of leg restraints was first discussed at the pretrial hearing
on March 5, 2015, when the court indicated that Rohwedder would need to
be restrained with leg restraints during the trial. R709:5. So that the jury
would not be aware that Rohwedder was resh·ained, the prosecution
suggested that the best approach would be "to have everyone do everything
while seated at the table," including questioning witnesses and opening
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statements. Id. Rohwedder' s standby counsel stated that the arrangement
was fine .. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the sergeant mentioned the
option of a taser vest, but noted that it could only be used in addition to,
and not instead of, leg restraints. R709:23.
On March 23, 2015, Rohwedder filed a motion for "unfettered
restraints" during the jury trial.

R498-99.

Rather than leg restraints,

Rohwedder requested the use of an electronic taser vest which would allow
him "unfettered movement to prevent prejudice." R499.
At the hearing on April 6, 2015, the use of leg restraints came up
again. R706:14. Rohwedder again stated that he preferred a taser vest
instead of leg restrains. The trial court again explained that a taser vest
could be used only with, not instead of, leg restraints. R706:14-15. The
sergeant explained that the leg restraints would not be visible but would be
noticeable to the jury if it saw Rohwedder walking. R706:68. To keep the
jury from seeing the restraints or suggesting that anything was different for
4.L

the defense, the court directed that both the prosecution and the defense
would remain seated at the table. R706:15. The court rejected Rohwedder' s
claim that this would "make[] me look guilty," noting that "we have
curtains that will surround in case there's any kind of issue, but with both
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sides being treated the same way and having the same appearance, I think
that's ... how we're going to approach it[.]" Id.
Rohwedder, however, decided to reject the court's provision that both
sides would remain seated at the table during trial. R709:69. Even though
he knew he would have to wear leg restraints, he decided that it would
"look less prejudicial to the jury ... to be able to walk up there even though
I have the leg restraints on[.]" Id. At Rohwedder's insistence, therefore, the
court determined that both the prosecution and the defense would be
vJ

allowed to get up from the table and move around. R709:70-72.
B.

As Defendant himself chose to make his leg restraints visible
to the jury, there was no due process violation.
"It is well established that a principal ingredient of due process is that

every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial." State v.

Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991) (quotations, citation, and
alteration omitted). "It necessarily follows from this that a criminal
defendant is generally entitled to the physical indicia of innocence." Id.
(quotations and citation omitted). Courts accordingly have, "with few
exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to
trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment" of the
presumption of innocence. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345 (Utah 1980);
accord State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,I21, 999 P.2d 7.
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Handcuffs or other restraints, however, are different. "If necessary to
secure the courtroom, a trial court may ... require a defendant to be
shackled." State v. Yocum, 2006 UT App 334, *1, 2006 WL 2302066. "While
compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state
policy, compelling an accused to be physically restrained furthers the
essential state policy of providing security in the courtroom." Mitchell, 824
P.2d at 473.
"For these reasons, courts have recognized that the right to be tried
without physical restraints is subject to exception." Id. "An accused may be
physically restrained if needed to prevent an escape, resort to violence, or
disruption of the trial." Id. But a defendant's right to a fair trial is not
violated if the trial court takes steps to ensure that the jury is unaware that
the defendant was restrained during court proceedings. See Madsen, 2002
UT App 345,

,8

("if the jury cannot see the defendant's shackles, there can

be no prejudice"); accord State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ,35, 153 P.3d
804; Mitchell, 824 P.2d at 474.
The record refutes Rohwedder's claim that "[t]he trial court required
Mr. Rohwedder to participate in his trial shackled and in plain view of the
jury." See Aplt. Br. 33.

Rohwedder does not contest the trial court's

determination that some form of restraint was necessary to maintain
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courtroom security.

Instead, he argues that the trial court could have

allowed him to be restrained only with a taser vest.
But the sergeant specifically explained that a taser vest could be used
only with leg restraints, not as a substitute. R706:14-15. Rohwedder has not
shown that this statement was incorrect, or even contested it.
Moreover, the court took active steps to prevent the Jury from
noticing Rohwedder' s leg restraints or suspecting that something was amiss
with the defense by directing that both the prosecution and the defense
would remain seated at the table during trial. R706:15. But Rohwedder
declined this solution and chose to make the jury aware of his leg restraints
by insisting on getting up and moving about the courtroom during the trial.
Aplt. Br. 33-34; R706:69-72.
Rohwedder argues that "[b]y forcing him to sit in his seat, Mr.
Rohwedder felt that the jury would unnecessarily focus on those limitations
of movement." Aplt. Br. 34. He cites no authority to support his claim that
he had a constitutional right to be tried while standing up and moving
around rather than sitting down. See Aplt. Br. 33-34. His feeling about how
the chosen security measures may have affected the jury did not define the
limits of the trial court's discretion to select appropriate measures.

As

shown, the record establishes that the only alternative he suggested below
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and suggests here was not available. And he also has not explained why
the jury would focus on his "limitations of movement" when the State
would have to proceed on the same limitations.
The trial court offered Rohwedder a way to keep the jury from seeing
his leg restraints without suggesting that the defense was proceeding any
differently than the State. He declined the offer. And he has not shown that
due process required the trial court to adopt different security measures.
Rohwedder cannot now complain of an alleged error he created on his own
behalf.

4r..
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on October 5, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General
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Addendun1A

RUL::: 238. MOT10hl TO Ri=MAI\JD FOP. FlNDII-.JG~ .... UT R RAi:i Ruie 235

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Title V. General Provisions
Rules App.Proc., Rule 23B

RULE 23B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
Currentness

(a) Grounds for Motion; Time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial
court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record
on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit
a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after
oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion
at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.

(b) Content of M~tion; Response; Reply. The content of the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show
the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice
suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall also be accompanied by a
proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The response shall include a proposed order of remand
that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such clai!Il to be addressed by
the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party.
Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is served.

(c) Order of the Court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met, the court may order that

the case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to complete
the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good
cause for a delay of reasonable length.

If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon
remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained.
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(d) Effect on Appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand
under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the court's motion.

(e) Proceedings Before the Trial Court. Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any claims of
ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial
court determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically identified
in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand.
The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of
the evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel
and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on
remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for
a delay of reasonable length.

(i) Preparation and Transmittal of the Record. At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the
trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by
these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court,
the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of
the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the
appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation
of the entire record.

(g) Appellate Court Determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the

parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during the
trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors
in other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review
of findings of fact in other appeals.

Credits
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998; November 1, 2010.]

Rules App. Proc., Rule 23B, UT R RAP Rule 23B
Current with amendments received through August 15, 2016.
End of Do~·11111~·nt

:(: 2016 Tlwmson Ri:utcrs. No dairn to original U.S. Govcrmrn:nt \V<1rks.
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Addendu1n B

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 1 1 2016

.:J

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
----00000--STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

)
)

V.

_BILLY L. ROHWEDDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER DENYING REMAND

)

)

Case No. 20150357-CA

Before Orme, Voros, and Roth.

This matter is before the court on Appellant Billy Rohwedder' s motion for
remand pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the
record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective," including facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient
performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a),(b).
To meet rule 23B's requirements, an appellant "must specifically identify
uncalled witnesses and 'identify specific facts of their testimony that might have helped
his case."' State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290,Cll 10. Although the proposed witnesses
themselves need not provide the affidavits to support a remand motion, the motion
must nonetheless be supported by affidavits alleging "specific facts and details that
relate to specific relevant occurrences." State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, 119.

Rohwedder has failed to provide the support required to warrant a remand
under rule 23B. He asserts that his first defense counsel's rationale for seeking
continuances is not in the record, but he does not include any specific information about
what that rationale was or why it would support a determination of ineffective
assistance that would be relevant in this appeal, which is from his second conviction
following remand and retrial as a result of his earlier appeal. At his retrial, he chose to
represent himself, but now, nonetheless, also asserts that his standby counsel failed to
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find a witness but does not provide any information about how that would have been
standby counsel's responsibility, what the witness would testify to, or whether that
witness is now available. Accordingly, the motion is based on mere speculation and
otherwise without merit.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Roh wedder' s motion for remand under rule 23B
is denied.
Dated this \ \~"' day of April, 2016.

FOR THE COURT:

20150357-CA

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on April 11, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
was sent by electronic mail to be delivered to:
I

I

THOMAS B BRUNKER

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
tbrunker@utah.gov

SAMUEL P NEWTON
LAW OFFICE OF SAMUEL P NEWTON PC
sam@snewtonlaw.com

r(?rx-/
By~
Nico~raJ
Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20150357
District Court No. 111909523
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